A discount is never just a discount. It is a lesson, and your buyer learns it the moment you offer one: the first number you gave them was not your real number. Every conversation after that - this deal, the renewal, the next deal - happens in a room where that is now true.

I am not against discounting. I am against discounting by reflex, late in a deal, because the silence got uncomfortable. That is not a pricing decision. That is a flinch.

The arithmetic is worse than it looks

Most founders hear "10 percent off" and think they have given up 10 percent. They have not, because your costs do not move when your price does.

Say the deal is 50,000 dollars a year and your gross margin is 70 percent. That is 15,000 to serve the customer and 35,000 of gross profit.

Take 10 percent off. The price is now 45,000. Your cost to serve is still 15,000. Your gross profit is 30,000. You have handed over 5,000, which is 14 percent of your profit on that deal, not 10.

The shortcut is to divide the discount by your gross margin. At a 70 percent margin, 10 percent off costs you 14 percent of profit, 15 percent off costs you 21, and 20 percent off costs you 29. Run it on your own margin before your next call.

To earn back the profit from a single 10 percent discount, you have to sell 17 percent more. Nobody discounts with that number in front of them.

On a subscription, it never stops

A one-off discount on a one-off sale is a bad day. A discount on a recurring contract is a standing order.

Fifteen percent off 50,000 is 7,500 a year. On a three-year term that is 22,500 you will never see. Worse, the renewal quote now starts at 42,500, because that is the number in their finance system and the number in their head. You did not discount a deal. You reset your price for that customer, permanently.

The four things your buyer actually learns

None of these are what you intended to teach:

  • Your first number was soft. If it moved once without anything changing, it can move again.
  • Pushing back pays. It cost them one sentence and earned them thousands. They will use that sentence every time now.
  • The renewal is negotiable too. You have taught them how this relationship works before it has started.
  • And they tell people. New Zealand is small. Buyers in the same sector sit on the same panels, move between the same organisations, and answer each other's calls. Your discount does not stay in the room.

That last one is the part founders here underestimate. In a bigger market a soft price is a private mistake. In this one it is a reference.

Trade, do not concede

The fix is not stubbornness. It is making sure a lower price is bought, not given. If your price moves, something on their side moves with it. Four things worth trading before you touch the number:

  • Term. A better rate exists at three years. It does not exist at twelve months. Now the discount buys you certainty instead of costing you margin.
  • Cash. Annually in advance rather than monthly. You are paying for their money instead of paying for their signature, and that is a defensible reason to move.
  • Scope. This is the one most founders skip. A smaller price should mean a smaller thing: fewer users, fewer modules, a lighter onboarding. Cutting price while holding scope tells them the extra was never worth anything.
  • Proof and access. A named case study, a reference call, a logo on your site, an introduction to the two peers they mentioned, or a decision by a firm date. These cost the buyer nothing and are worth real money to you.

Say it as a trade, out loud: "I can get to that number on a three-year term with annual payment. On twelve months and monthly, I cannot." One sentence, and your price is intact either way.

If you do discount, give it a reason and an expiry

Sometimes you will move anyway. A first customer in a segment you want, a deal that funds the quarter. Fine. Just make it legible.

Give it a reason that is specific and does not generalise - a foundation-customer rate, a pilot rate. Give it an end date. Write into the agreement what the price reverts to and when. A discount with no reason and no expiry is not a discount, it is your new price list.

If the pushback arrived before you had ever established what their current problem costs them, the number was never the issue. That is a different piece: why "you're too expensive" is rarely about price. And if you are quoting into Australia or the US, the discount reflex usually points at a deeper problem, which I have written about over on nickburns.world.

The question to sit with

Think about the last three deals where you moved on price. Not whether you should have. Something narrower:

What did each of those buyers give you in return, and if the answer is nothing, what have you taught them about the number you will open with next time?

Not sure where your price is really leaking?

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Where this comes from. The discount arithmetic above is worked arithmetic, not a survey finding, and you can check it: on a 50,000 dollar deal at a 70 percent gross margin, cost to serve is 15,000 and gross profit is 35,000. A 10 percent discount cuts the price to 45,000 while cost to serve stays at 15,000, so gross profit falls to 30,000 - a 5,000 drop, which is 14.3 percent of 35,000. The general shortcut is discount divided by gross margin (10/70 = 14.3 percent, 15/70 = 21.4 percent, 20/70 = 28.6 percent). Recovering the lost profit needs 35,000/30,000 = 1.167, or 16.7 percent more volume. The 70 percent margin and the 50,000 deal size are stated assumptions for the worked example, not claims about your business - substitute your own. Everything else here draws on my own work with more than 60 tech companies in New Zealand and offshore, and on 20-plus years selling technology, starting at Emendo, which my co-founders and I sold to McKesson in late 2012. No third-party statistics are cited, and no client pricing, named deal or contract term is disclosed.
Nick Burns is a sales coach and fractional revenue leader based in Christchurch. He co-founded Emendo in 2002, sold it to McKesson - then 14th on the Fortune 500 - in 2012, and has since helped 60+ tech companies grow sales without the founder having to win every deal.