When buyers tell you that you are too expensive, almost none of them mean it. What they mean is that they cannot yet see what they are getting for the money. Those are very different problems, and they have very different fixes.

This is the single most consistent pattern I have seen across the tech companies I have worked with. It shows up in IT services, in health tech, in education platforms, in hardware with software wrapped around it. Different products, different buyers, same conversation.

The tell: the price landed before the value did

Go back through a deal that stalled on price and find the moment the number first came up. In most stalled deals, it arrived early - in the second meeting, in the deck, sometimes in the first email because the buyer asked and it felt rude not to answer.

At that moment, what did the buyer actually know? Usually that your product exists, roughly what it does, and that other options exist. What they did not know was the size of the problem they currently have, in their own numbers.

So the price had nothing to sit against. A number on its own is just a number, and a number on its own always looks big.

Price is not expensive or cheap. It is expensive or cheap relative to something. If you have not built the something, you have handed your buyer nothing to compare against except your competitor's price.

Why "we're better" does not fix it

The instinct when you hear the price objection is to add. More features on the slide. A longer list of what is included. A comparison table where you win most rows.

That rarely moves anything, because you are answering a question the buyer did not ask. They are not confused about what your product contains. They are unconvinced that the outcome is worth what you are asking. Feature lists speak to contents. Buyers pay for consequences.

And the reality is that a longer list often makes it worse. It reads as justification, and justification signals doubt.

What to do instead: quantify the current state first

Before your price appears anywhere, the buyer should be able to say out loud what their current situation is costing them. Not your estimate of it - theirs.

That means asking, and then doing the arithmetic together in the room:

  • What happens today? Walk the actual process, step by step, with the person who does it.
  • How often? Per week, per month, per site, per customer. Get a real number, even a rough one.
  • What does each occurrence cost? Time, rework, a lost customer, a missed compliance window, a delayed invoice.
  • What have they already tried? Failed attempts are cost too, and they are usually the most vivid part of the story.

You are not selling yet. You are helping them see a number they have never added up. When they say it themselves, it is theirs. When you say it for them, it is a sales claim.

Then introduce price as a comparison, not an announcement

Once the current-state number exists, your price stops being an announcement and becomes a comparison. Twelve thousand a year against a problem the buyer has just told you costs them ninety is an easy conversation. The same twelve thousand against nothing is a hard one.

Nothing about the product changed. Only the order of the conversation did.

The three sentences worth rehearsing

If you want one practical thing to take away, rehearse these before your next pricing conversation:

  • "Before we talk about our pricing, can I check I have understood what this is costing you now?" This buys you permission to go back and do the work you skipped.
  • "So on your numbers, that's roughly X a year. Does that feel about right, or is it higher?" Asking whether it is higher is deliberate. It usually is.
  • "Against that, here's what this costs." Then stop talking. The silence is doing the comparing.

When it really is the price

Sometimes it genuinely is. The buyer has no budget this year, or you are aimed at a segment that cannot afford you, or a competitor is priced somewhere you cannot follow.

That is worth knowing, and knowing it early is a gift. But you cannot tell the difference between a real price problem and a value-sequencing problem until you have done the current-state work. Most founders never get far enough to find out, because the objection arrives and the discount comes out.

Discounting a deal where value was never established does not win the deal. It just teaches the buyer that your first number was not serious.

So next time you hear it, before you move on price, ask yourself one question: at the moment I said the number, could my buyer have told me what their problem costs them?

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Where this comes from. This piece draws on my own work with more than 60 tech companies in New Zealand and offshore, and on 20-plus years selling technology - starting at Emendo, which my co-founders and I sold to McKesson in late 2012. It makes no third-party statistical claims: the example figures used above are illustrative arithmetic, not measured results. Client examples are described in general terms and no client pricing is disclosed.
Nick Burns is a sales coach and fractional revenue leader based in Christchurch. He co-founded Emendo in 2002, sold it to McKesson - then 14th on the Fortune 500 - in 2012, and has since helped 60+ tech companies grow sales without the founder having to win every deal.